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v. Okin, 478 F.
Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d
650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S.Ct. 1972 (1981).
OF MEDICATION NARROWLY CONSTRUED-Rogers

In response to the public's growing awareness of the treatment of
the mentally ill,1 the courts have expressed increasing concern over the
intrusiveness of forced administration of medication to patients in
state mental health institutions. 2 The constitutional right of an individual to refuse potentially harmful antipsychotic drugs 3 is considered

to be among the "penumbral right[s] to privacy, bodily integrity,
[and] personal security" protected by the due process clause of the
Once routinely subjected to inhuman conditions, the mentally ill were often isolated from
their families in warehouse-like state institutions until federal funding in the 1950's and 1960's
provided alternative modes of treatment. See generally Dowben, Legal Rights of the Mentally
Impaired, 16 Hous. L. REv. 833, 834-36 (1979); Kopesky, Psychosurgery and the Involuntarily
Confined, 24 VILL. L. REV.. 949, 950 (1978-1979) (development of regulations concerning use of
psychosurgery (lobotomy)).
1 See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (appeal pending); In re the Mental
Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980); Goedecke v. State Dep't of Insts., 198 Colo. 407,
603 P.2d.123 (1979); In re Guardianship of Richard Roe III, No. S.J.C. 2257, slip op. at 981
(Mass. 1981) (antipsychotic medication may be forcibly administered to incompetent non-institutionalized mental health patient only when proved beyond reasonable doubt that incompetent
will be harmful to himself or others).
I Antipsychotic drugs are "chemical agents" used in the treatment of mental illness. They
are also referred to as neuroleptic and psychotropic drugs. The function of antipsychotic drugs is
to reduce the level of psychotic thinking, and "it is virtually undisputed" that they are capable of
altering the mind. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S.Ct. 1972 (1981).
"Toxic" side effects frequently include temporary, muscular (extra-pyramidal) symptoms:
dystonic reactions (muscle spasms, irregular flexing or writhing movements, protrusion of the
tongue); akathesia (inability to stay still, restlessness, agitation); mask-like face, drooling, muscle
stiffness, rigidity and shuffling gait; non-muscular effects (drowsiness, weakness, weight gain,
dizziness, fainting, low blood pressure, dry mouth, blurred vision, loss of sexual desire, apathy,
depression, constipation, diarrhea, and changes in the blood).
Tardive dyskinesia is the most devastating of long-term effects of antipsychotic drugs. Its
symptoms often do not appear until after a considerable period of the treatment and may only
manifest themselves after discontinuation of the drug. Symptoms include involuntary muscle
movements of the lips and tongue, ulcerations of the mouth and incomprehensible speech. In
severe cases, swallowing and breathing become impaired. Tardive dyskinesia can continue for
years and is difficult to cure. Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to
Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. Rzv. 461, 475-78 (1977).
4 Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D. Mass. 1979) afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 634
F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1972 (1981). The right of privacy was
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The right to
maintain and safeguard bodily integrity was upheld in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
772 (1966). The due process clause guarantee was recognized in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 673 (1977) ("Among the historic liberties [protected by the due process clause] was the right
to be free from . . .unjustified intrusions on personal security").
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fourteenth amendment. 5 The extension of this right to mental health
patients is being considered by the courts as part of the current movement toward more stringent regulation of treatment procedures in
state hospitals. 6
The right of the mentally ill to refuse forcible medication was
upheld by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Rogers v. Okin,7 the broadest decision on the issue thus
far.8 In 1975, seven patients 9 residing at the Boston State Hospital
brought a class action seeking to enjoin medication and seclusion
practices which they contended infringed upon their constitutional
rights.' 0 Plaintiffs also sought compensatory and punitive damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The state commissioner of mental health,
other health officials and physicians responsible for patient care, defendants, asserted that committed patients are not competent to make
treatment decisions. 2 They maintained that no patient was forcibly

5 Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d
650, 653 (lst Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1972 (1981). The due process clause reads:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 Experimental psychosurgery (lobotomy) and electroconvulsive (shock) therapy require
consent. MAss. ANN. LAW., ch. 123, § 23 (Michie/Law Co-op 1972). See generally Craige,
Rennie v. Klein: Constitutional Right of Privacy Protects a Mental Patient'sRefusal of Psychotropic Medication, 57 N.C. L. REv. 1481 (1979).
1 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1972 (1981).
8 See Burke, Mental Patients Say No!, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 10, col. 1.
9 Plaintiffs included Rubie Rogers, Able Bolden, Betty Bybel, James Colleran, Donna
Hunt, Willie Wadsworth, and Harold Warner. 478 F. Supp. at 1354. Ms. Rogers, a forty-three
year old mental patient at Boston State Hospital, was so intent on avoiding further treatment
with antipsychotic drugs that she set her bed on fire. While she recovered from her burns at
another hospital, treatment with drugs was suspended. So desperate was Ms. Rogers to escape
forcible medication that she repeated her actions three more times during the next few years. See
note 8 supra.
1'478 F. Supp. at 1352-53. The class, certified by the district court on October 16, 1975,
included " 'all
persons, who are presently, or will be, patients at the May and Austin Units of
Boston State Hospital and who have been or will be secluded without their consent or medicated
without their consent.' " Id. at 1352 n.L
"Id. at 1380. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
12478 F. Supp. at 1353.
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medicated unless a "psychiatric emergency," defined as a "foreseeable
deterioration of the patient absent medication," occurred.1 3 Defendants contended seclusion was employed only as permitted under Mas14
sachusetts law .
A temporary restraining order was issued by the district court on
April 30, 1975, prohibiting the forcible administration of medication
and forbidding seclusion in non-emergency situations. ' After a fourteen month trial, the district court concluded that voluntarily and
involuntarily committed mental patients may be forcibly medicated
only in an emergency.'
In an opinion by Judge Tauro, the court
defined an emergency as a situation "in which a failure to [medicate]
would result in a substantial likelihood of physical harm to that
17
patient, other patients, or to staff members of the institution."'
Seclusion practices, provided by Massachusetts law, were limited by
the court to a clearly defined emergency.' 8 The district court's findings were considered sufficient for injunctive relief but did not support
the plaintiffs' damage claims. '9
Cross-appeals followed and, on November 25, 1980, Chief Judge
Coffin, for the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, affirmed in
part, reversed in part, vacated, and remanded Rogers v. Okin 20 to the
district court for further determination. The court of appeals vacated
the district court's definition of an emergency situation as too restrictive to be functional .21 Chief Judge Coffin held that mental health
13 Id.

11Id. MASS. ANN. LAws,ch. 123, § 21 (Michie/Law Co-op 1972) provides that "restraint
may be used only in cases of emergency such as the occurrence of, or serious threat of, extreme
violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide," if authorized in writing by the designated
physician or superintendent.
Is 478 F. Supp. at 1353.
16 Id. at 1365, 1368. Patients who are voluntarily committed have volunteered to enter a
mental health institution and are considered to be competent to make that decision. Involuntarflycommitted patients are not considered competent to decide to forego hospitalization, although there is a presumption of competency to manage their other affairs. See note 30 infra and
accompanying text.
11 478 F. Supp. at 1365.
18 See note 14 supra.
19 478 F. Supp. at 1382-83. Although the district court determined that five of the plaintiffs
were forcibly medicated and that five others were secluded in a non-emergency situation prior to
the issuance of the temporary restraining order in 1975, Judge Tauro denied damages to any of
the plaintiffs. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the "defendants acted in
subjective good faith [without] 'an impermissible motivation,' " and they could only be held
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they clearly violated the patients' constitutional rights. Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 662 (lst Cir. 1980). The district court also rejected plaintiffs' attempts to
recover damages under theories of false imprisonment, assault and battery, and medical malpractice. 478 F. Supp. at 1383-88. The court of appeals agreed. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650,
663 (1st Cir. 1980).
N 634 F.2d 650, 664 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1972 (1981).
21 Id. at 654-57.
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patients cannot be medicated in a non-emergency unless found to be
incompetent.22 The district court's requirement of guardian approval
of the decision to forcibly medicate an incompetent patient was held
to be constitutionally unnecessary.2 3 The court of appeals returned
the task of balancing the interests of the individual against those of the
institution to the discretion of the physician. 24 The district court was
reversed on its decision allowing a patient who is voluntarily committed to a state institution to have the right to refuse forcible medication.25 Denial of plaintiffs' damage claims was affirmed by the court
2
of appeals . 6
In addressing the fundamental right of a mental health patient to
refuse antipsychotic drugs, the district court had concluded that most
committed mental health patients, although somewhat impaired in
"their relationship to reality, [could perceive] the benefits, risks, and
discomfort" resulting from treatment. 27 Massachusetts law provides
that a mental health patient, even though committed, is presumed
competent to manage his affairs, dispose of property, vote, and even
engage in a profession. 28 The district court, therefore, found no merit
in defendants' argument that once admitted to a mental institution, a
patient is incompetent to decide whether to accept or reject treatment.29 The court of appeals observed, however, that some mental
patients may be "dangerous to . . . themselves or others [and] are
unable to make any meaningful choice as to whether they should
30
accept treatment."
The court of appeals joined the district court in recognizing that
individuals have "a constitutionally protected interest in being left
free by the state to decide . . . whether to submit to [a] serious and
potentially harmful medical treatment." 31 Plaintiffs contended that
the fact that an individual is mentally. . . and resides in an institution
should not permit the disregard of those rights. The defendants, however, had argued that the interests of the mentally ill "are fundamentally different from those . . . who are not mentally ill." 32 Patients'
interests could even be said to be consistent with the state's interest in
22

Id. at 656.

23

Id. at 659-61.

214Id.

at 655-57.

2 Id. at 661.
26 Id. at 662-63.
27 478 F. Supp. at 1361.
218MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 123, § 25 (Michie/Law Co-op 1972).

29 478 F. Supp. at 1361.
"o 634 F.2d at 654.
31
32

Id. at 653.
id. at 654.
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forcible medication, 33 the rationale being that "[a] person must be
34
restored to sanity, . . . before he can enjoy [his] rights."
The state utilized two vehicles, its police power 35 and the doctrine of parens patriae, 36 as justification for forcible medication under
certain circumstances. Such circumstances include the protection of
persons from physical harm inflicted by a violent mental health patient or the providing of care to citizens unable to care for themselves. 37 On appeal, defendants argued that in permitting forcible
medication only in an emergency situation,- the district court defined
an emergency too narrowly. Instead, an emergency should include
circumstances giving rise to the desire to treat a patient more effectively. 39 As defined by the district court, the requirement of finding a
"substantial likelihood of physical harm" was claimed to be "overly
rigid and unworkable," 40 thereby not allowing the flexibility essential
in dealing with patients' violent behavior. 4' The court of appeals
held that the district court's standard, requiring the physician to
predict the probability that violent behavior will ensue if no medica42
tion is given, was too simplistic to be functional.
In the institutional environment in which many patients with a
"demonstrated proclivity" toward violent behavior are involuntarily
confined, the state's interest in averting violence becomes of the utmost importance. 43 This is accentuated by the possibility that the
patients themselves would be the most likely victims of any violent
acts. Balanced against these compelling interests is the patient's right

33

Id.

Burke, supra note 8, at 10 (quoting Joel I. Klein who prepared the amicus curiae brief for
the American Psychiatric Association).
35 634 F.2d at 656. Police power enables the government to make and enforce laws in the
interest of the public health and safety.
31 Id. at 654, 657-61. This doctrine obligates the State to protect and control incompetents,
orphans, and dependent children.
37 Id. at 655, 657.
38 478 F. Supp. at 1365. See text accompanying note 17 supra for district court's definition of
an "emergency situation." The court of appeals found the term "substantial likelihood" unclear
and pointed to the district court's explanation that the term means "'more-likely-than-not." 634
F.2d at 657.
34

31
40

634 F.2d at 654-56.
Id.

11 Id. at 654-55.
41 Id. The court of appeals took an example of the physicians' dilemma from the testimony of
one director of the state hospital. When a patient who tolerated antipsychotic drugs well seemed
about to become violent, the director stated that he would have forcibly administered medication as a precaution if no limits were in effect. Since the director could not clearly predict that
the patient would become violent without medication, no drugs were administered. The patient
later became violent and injured a staff member. Id. at 655.
43

Id.
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as a competent individual to be free from the forcible administration
of antipsychotic drugs. 44 The court of appeals held that the "individualized estimation of the possibility and type of violence," 45 combined
with the drug's estimated effect on that individual and the evaluation
of the utility of less restrictive alternatives, are within the realm of the
professional judgment of the trained psychiatrist and should not be
superseded by the district court's standard. 46 In sum, the court of
appeals emphasized that judges are less qualified than psychiatrists to
render psychiatric judgments, 47 and therefore, "courts should not 'second-guess administrators on matters on which they are better informed.' "48
By permitting physicians to rely upon their discretion, Chief
Judge Coffin did not intend to remove all constitutional limits. In
order to forcibly medicate mental health patients, the state must act
within the scope of its police power; consequently, "the decision must
be the result of a determination that the need to prevent violence in a
particular situation outweighs the possibility of harm [from the drug
administered] to the medicated individual. ' 4 Further safeguards
mandate the elimination of any reasonable alternatives to administering antipsychotic drugs. If the patient is not adjudged to be incompetent, medication given only for treatment purposes cannot be administered over the patient's objections.5 0 On remand, the district court
was directed to examine and determine the existence of a less restrictive standard, but was cautioned to avoid "the creation of general,
substantive standards for weighing the competing interests." 51
The district court's standard, calling for a "substantial likelihood
of physical harm," 52 should not take the place of "an individualized
balancing of the ... [patient's] varying interests . . .. in refusing
antipsychotic medication against the equally varying interests of
44 Id.

I Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 655-56. By illustration, the court of appeals surmised:

41

48

49

[I]f the violence feared is potentially life-threatening, and the patient's prior experience with antipsychotics favorable, it would be patently unreasonable to require
that [physicians] determine that the probability of the feared violence occurring is
greater than fifty percent before they can act. By contrast, if the patient has
experienced severe adverse side-effects from antipsychotics, it would only be reasonable to expect [physicians] to explore less harmful alternatives much more vigorously. Id.
Id. at 656.
Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 (1979)).
634 F.2d at 656.

50Id.
51Id. (emphasis in original).
52 Id. at 654.
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patients-and the state-in preventing violence."
Because this balancing necessarily involves complex factors, it is best left to the judgment of state physicians. The district court was directed to confine
itself to designing procedures to ensure that medication is not given
forcibly absent a finding that the interests of the patients are outweighed and that no reasonable alternatives are available.5
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the existence of a legitimate
state interest in providing care for persons who cannot care for themselves is well established.5 5 The court of appeals observed that this
doctrine has been extended to the forcible administration of medical
treatment to patients in Massachusetts hospitals.5 6 Treatment by
antipsychotic drugs has proven effectiveness, but devastating side effects often result.5 7 The court of appeals in Rogers held that such an
intrusion upon the individual's right of privacy must occur only if the
patient lacks the capacity to make competent treatment decisions.5 8
Although the parties were in agreement on this issue, they conflicted
over whether a determination of incapacity had been made regarding
the plaintiffs.5 9 Defendants argued that state proceedings for commitment are a sufficient determination of incapacity to permit forcible medication, and that it would be "illogical to accept the patients'
same objections to treatment" after overriding their decision to reject
voluntary hospitalization.6 0 The court of appeals upheld the district
court's conclusion that Massachusetts law contains no judicial determination of incapacity.6 ' The commitment decision is then "an inadequate predicate" to justify the forcible administration of drugs
under the state's parens patriae power. 2

51Id. at 655-56.
51 Id. at 657.
55 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
- 634 F.2d at 657. The court of appeals cited In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845)
(discussed in Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L.
REv. 1190, 1209 (1974)).
5' Plotkin, supra note 3, at 474-77.
" 634 F.2d at 657.
59 Id.

o 634 F.2d at 657-58.
61 Id. at 658 (emphasis in original).
62 Involuntary commitment in Massachusetts necessitates a judicial finding that an individual is mentally ill, and, if not hospitalized, a "likelihood of serious harm" would be created.
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 123 §§ 7, 8 (Michie/Law Co-op 1972). "Likelihood of serious harm" is
defined as:
(1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person himself as manifested by
evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm;
(2) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence of
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The court of appeals recognized the need for a procedure under
which the state can treat a patient who lacks the capacity to accept or
reject needed treatment.6 3 The district court had decided that to
ensure the patient's right "to be free from unwarranted government
intrusion," a guardian would be appointed to manage the affairs of
those adjudicated incompetent. 4 Defendants' reluctance to rely on a
guardian to make medication decisions on behalf of the incompetent
patient stemmed from the ineffectiveness of the necessary procedures
implemented by the courts in Massachusetts.6 5 The district court
concluded that a guardian may exercise any rights for an incompetent, committed mental patient concerning treatment decisions in a
non-emergency situation.*66
The court of appeals modified the district court's holding requiring an adjudication of incompetency and guardian approval for nonemergency forcible medication.6 7 While judicial process is certainly
preferred, state officials must be able to respond to situations where a
judicial determination would be neither practical nor suitable. The
court of appeals remanded to the district court to devise alternative
methods to determine incompetency in a "psychiatric emergency"
where delay could lead to a "significant deterioration of the patient's

homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them; or
(3) a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury to the person himself as
manifested by evidence that such person's judgment is so affected that he is
unable to protect himself in the community and that reasonable provision for his
protection is not available in the community.
MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 123, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op 1972).
Only under the third definition does a sufficient nexus exist between an individual's incompetency to decide about commitment and the conclusion that involuntary commitment may
render the individual incompetent to decide on his own treatment. 634 F.2d at 658. The two
preceding definitions do not provide adjudication of "judgmental capacity," and it is impossible
to differentiate between individuals committed under § 1(3) and those committed under § 1 (1) or
§ 1(2). Therefore, a patient may be committed even though he may "competently [believe] that
treatment was not in his best interest[s]." Id. MAss. ANN. LAWS,, ch. 123, § 25 (Michie/Law
Co-op 1972) determines incompetency by a separate legal proceeding, a further indication that
the commitment proceeding is not intended to mean that an individual lacks the capacity to
make decisions about his treatment.
63 634 F.2d at 659. Cf. Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters, 368 Mass. 631, 635-36, 334
N.E.2d 629, 632 (1975) ("incompetence... was never equated with commitment or admission
to a mental health facility").
' 478 F. Supp. at 1362.
65 Id. at 1362-63. The district court redirected defendants' dissatisfaction to the legislature
for redress and declared that any delay in acquiring guardians was a matter for the attention of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Additionally, the district court did not require full
scale probate proceedings. Id.
' 478 F. Supp. at 1364.
67 634 F.2d at 661.
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mental health." 68 Chief Judge Coffin also rejected the notion, implicit in the district court's holding, that once a patient is adjudicated
incompetent, all treatment involving antipsychotic drugs must be
made by a traditional guardian.6" The court of appeals regarded this
requirement as impractical since it would include not only decisions to
administer drugs, but also decisions not to medicate, which would be
70
difficult to enforce.
To be constitutionally correct, state action derived from the
parens patriae power must approach the treatment decision as if it
was being decided by the individual patient himself. 7 ' In Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,7 2 the guardian ad litem of a
mentally incompetent patient who suffered from leukemia decided
that treatment by chemotherapy would not be in the patient's best
interest. The doctrine of "substituted judgment," utilized by the
Saikewicz court, determined that had he been competent, a patient
who was in fact mentally incompetent and terminally ill would not
elect not to undergo a painful medical treatment. 73 Once a patient
has been adjudged incompetent, Chief Judge Coffin held that treatment decisions must be made as though the patient were competent to
make them himself. 74 As a further precaution, on remand, the court
of appeals in Rogers suggested that some procedural requirements be
instituted by the district court such as a "periodic review by nontreat75
ing physicians."
Finding no distinction between those voluntarily and involuntarily committed, the district court held that voluntarily committed
patients have the right to refuse medication absent an emergency.7 6
Defendants' contention that patients can be made to choose between
accepting the medication prescribed or leaving the hospital was rejected. 77 The court of appeals found that the effect of the district
8 Id. at 660.
Id. The implication of the district court's ruling may be that defendants must consult a
guardian when they decide to withhold medication from an incompetent patient. Since a failure
to medicate an incompetent patient may result in the "unnecessary and possibly irreversible
continuation of his illness," the decision not to medicate must also be seriously considered. Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 661.
72 373 Mass. 728, 753, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977).
73 Id. at 746-53, 370 N.E.2d at 428-31.
71 634 F.2d at 661.
75 Id.
76 478 F. Supp. at 1368.
77 Id. Defendants' position was that patients who are voluntarily committed "implicitly

agree" to accept whatever treatment is prescribed, and under a contract theory, would waive
any right of refusal. The district court held that the consent form that patients signed did not
give clear evidence that the right to refuse existed and was therefore inadequate. Id. at 1367-68.

NOTES

1981]

court's decision was to give voluntarily committed patients "a constitutional right . . . to dictate to the hospital staff the treatment that
they are given."' 78 No authority was cited for this holding and the
court of appeals reversed, stating that Massachusetts law does not give
voluntarily committed patients the right to choose their own treatment. Instead, the statute suggests a treatment regimen that the hospital staff determines is best. Patients who do not agree have the
79
option of leaving the hospital.
In conclusion, the court of appeals emphasized that the plaintiffs,
defendants, and amici curiae8" were aligned in their efforts to achieve
a common goal-adequate care for patients in state hospitals. 81 Chief
Judge Coffin stated that the procedural devices necessary to reach an
acceptable balance between "deference to professional judgment and
respect for competent individual judgment" 82 must be more closely
suited to the institutional setting than to the judicial format. In its
effort to determine the circumstances under which mental health
patients may be forcibly medicated without constitutional violation,
the court of appeals may have arrested the trend toward further
definition of this right of the mentally ill.
The current movement within the legal community to invoke
constitutional protection for the right of the mentally ill to refuse
treatment is prompted by concern that the state has conferred "too
much naked authority" on psychiatrists in the exercise of control over
the involuntarily committed person.8 3 Psychiatrists often oppose legal procedures because of possible delay before treatment and
consistently view the choice of treatment as outside the scope of the
judiciary. An improper distinction has developed between the concept
of "health," as the exclusive domain of the medical profession, and the
concept of "liberty," in which the Supreme Court includes the free4
dom to make decisions regarding one's health.
The physician's proper role is to recommend treatment alternatives to the patient. If no threat to the public welfare exists, the
78 634
79

F.2d at 661.

Id.

0 Amici curiaeincluded the American Psychiatric Association, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the Mental Health Association, the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, the
Mental Patients' Liberation Front, the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, and the
Massachusetts Hospital Association, Inc.
81 634 F.2d at 664.
82 id.
83 Plotkin, supra note 3, at 462.
8" Id. at 463. See, e.g., Justice Douglas' concurring opinion written for both Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (opinion reported in Bolton). See
also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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individual has the final authority to select among these various alternatives.8 5 Sole dependence on a physician's best judgment, however,
is a dangerous precept because it presumes certainty of diagnosis,
adequacy of judgment, and sufficiency of resources for proper care. 8
In reality, state institutions "are overcrowded, understaffed and underfinanced." 8 7 The duty clearly rests with the legal community, not
the medical profession, to protect the rights of civilly committed
patients and to determine precisely when they may be medicated
against their will. The court of appeal's decision to return this determination to the discretion of the psychiatrist acted to further remove
much needed judicial scrutiny of treatment practices in state hospitals. 88
In Rennie v. Klein, 89 district court Judge Brotman recognized a
qualified right of patients to refuse treatment and held that due
process requirements must be met before a patient can be forcibly
medicated.9 0 In a subsequent action, 91 in which plaintiff Rennie was
joined by a class of mental health patients, the New Jersey district
court defined an emergency situation, which would justify forcible
medication, as a "sudden, significant change in the patient's condition
which creates danger to the patient himself or to others in the hospital."'9 2 Forced drugging of patients was considered to be just "as
intrusive as the involuntary confinement resulting from commitment. '' 3 The potential for permanent4 "deprivation of a protected
9
liberty interest" should not be ignored.
85 Plotkin, supra note 3, at 463.
86 Id. at 463 & n.8. "There can be little responsible debate regarding 'the uncertainty of
diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.' " O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350
U.S. 366, 375 (1956)).
87 Plotkin, supra note 3, at 463. Fifty-eight percent of full-time physician staff positions are
occupied by graduates of foreign medical schools, "forty-three of whom are not fully licensed to
practice in that state." Id. at 463-64.
8 Incidents involving forcible medication detailed in Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294,
1300-03 (D.N.J. 1979), demonstrate the need for greater judicial involvement in regulating
hospital treatment practices.
89 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978). See also Craige, supra note 6.
90 462 F. Supp. at 1144-45. Four factors must be weighed prior to granting the right to refuse
medication:
(1) the patient's physical threat to other patients and staff at the institution,
(2) the patient's capacity to decide on his particular treatment,
(3) the existence of any less restrictive treatments, and
(4) the risk of permanent side effects from the proposed treatment.
Id.
91 Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (appeal pending).
82 Id. at 1313.
83 Id. at 1307.
94

Id.
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The effectiveness of using antipsychotic drugs to treat all types of
mental illness is currently being questioned. 5 The district court in
Rennie was persuaded that many patients who would ordinarily receive antipsychotic drugs could improve without them. Findings presented to that court included the possibilities that antipsychotic drugs
might frustrate the ability of the patient to develop social skills necessary for a full recovery. In addition, there is a possibility that the
drugs may cause cancer.9 6 A history of forcible medication, coupled
with the "vulnerability and helplessness" of mentally ill patients, led
the court in Rennie to hold that the constitutional right to refuse
treatment can only realistically exist if the hospital obtains written
consent from informed patients prior to medication. 7 Permitting the
use of antipsychotic drugs on patients who are uninformed about their
potentially dangerous long-term effects, as were plaintiffs in Rogers, is
a practice the judicial system should prohibit.
In Rogers v. Okin, the court of appeals reversed the district
court's determination that voluntarily committed patients have a right
to refuse treatment and held that they may leave the hospital if they
choose to reject the physician's suggestions.9
While correct in theory,
this position does not allow for the possibility that voluntarily committed patients may be unaware of their right to leave the institution.
Voluntary admission has been viewed as a form of entrapment which
serves "to avoid the inconvenience of involuntary hospitalization." 99
Mentally ill patients make very few important decisions themselves.
The fact that they rely almost entirely on their physicians and the staff
is cause to question whether any "element of voluntariness" is present
at all. 0 0 Denial of the right to refuse treatment to voluntarily committed patients should be reconsidered in light of the defacto involuntariness that is part of the total environs of the mental health institution.
The historical concept of a merger between the commitment
decision and a determination of incompetency has finally been abandoned by both the courts and the medical profession. 10 ' In In re
9' 476 F. Supp. at 1298.
Id. at 1299.
87 Id. at 1307. Voluntary patients at Boston State Hospital sign a consent form that reads, "I
understand that during my hospitalization and any after care, I will be given care and treatment
which may include the injection of medicines." Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. at 1367. The
district court held that this language was inadequate to constitute a waiver of the right to refuse
because it was unclear that the patient understood that such a right existed. Id. at 1368.
88 634 F.2d at 661.
" Plotkin, supra note 3, at 464 n.13.
100Id. at 487.
"I1Id. at 488-89 & nn. 169 & 170.
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Boyd,102 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded
that, even after civil commitment, the decision to refuse treatment by
a mentally ill adult cannot be disregarded unless he is adjudicated
incompetent. 0 3 The distinction between incompetency and involuntary commitment has been recognized by the court of appeals in
Rogers, and must be preserved by prohibiting the psychiatrist's discretion and authority to become the sole basis upon which the bodily
integrity of the individual may be violated.
Recognition that constitutionally protected liberties should extend to the mental health patient is an essential part of the progression
of the courts out of the past era of judicial restraint. Professor
Laurence Tribe warns against too cursory an evaluation of procedural
protections when the bodily integrity of the individual is in danger of
being violated. 10 4 The concern is that intrusions, such as forcible
medication, like the "most awful tortures . . . can be cloaked with
such clockwork logic that many become persuaded of their perverse
5 The logic of the court of appeals, in returning a large part
justice." 10
of the decision to forcibly medicate to the physician, calls for special
safeguards to prevent diminution of the newly emerging rights of the
mental health patient.
Psychiatric treatment is within the realm of social actions that
must be measured by appropriate judicial standards to ensure that
treatment does not encroach upon individual freedoms. Professor
Tribe cautioned that "turning square corners . . . must never become
a substitute for respecting the humanity of each individual." 01 6 In
fashioning appropriate procedures for the protection of these new
found rights, the objective of the judiciary must continue to be the
protection of the individual against the temptation to peer too infrequently behind the walls of the mental health institution.
Ann W. Housner

102

403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979).

103 Id. at 749. In Rogers v. Okin, the court noted that there was a " 'profound' distinction

between commitment and determination of incompetency." 634 F.2d at 659 (quoting Boyd v.
Board of Registrars of Voters, 308 Mass. 631, 635-36, 334 N.E.2d 629, 632 (1975)).
104 L. TRIBE, AMEI CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 15-9, at 916 (1978).
105Id. at 915-16. See F. KAFKA, The Penal Colony, in PENAL COLONY: STOFUES AND SHORT
PhEmCS (Schocken ed. 1948).
106L. TRIBE, supra note 104, at 916.

